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W.B. Yeats‟s tentative entry into modernist poetics is often ascribed to his
residence with Pound, to the dynamism of Vorticism, and to the turbulent social
upheaval in Ireland and abroad during the early decades of the twentieth century.
Without denying that such events contributed to Yeats‟s marked stylistic shift in
Responsibilities (1914), this thesis examines how Yeats‟s antithetical impulse is
heavily informed by Blake and Nietzsche and has direct bearing for how we read
Yeats‟s poetics through change and “transition.” Concurrent with his passive
adjustment to, and resistance against, external forces and change, Yeats‟s
affirmation of pre-subjective forces, apocalyptic renewal, and vitalist notions of
perpetual becoming informs how he effected transformation in his poetics. Poised
between monumentality and movement, between the symmetrical and the sensual,
Yeats‟s dynamic poetics complicate how we think of Modernism as a transitive
field.
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Introduction
Change has come suddenly, the despair of my friends in the „nineties part
of its preparation. Nature, steel-bound or stone-built in the nineteenth
century, became a flux where men drowned or swam; the moment had
come for some poet to cry „the flux is in my mind.‟ (195)
W.B Yeats, Introduction to The Oxford Book of Modern Verse

Must a poet react to changing circumstances? In his long introduction to The
Oxford Book of Modern Verse in 1936, Yeats found occasion to dismiss such a notion by
distancing himself from the inundating tragedies greeting the preeminent participants of
the Rhymer‟s Club at the turn of the 20th century: Ernest Dowson, the decadent pen of
novels and short stories, drowning in alcoholism in 1900 at the age of thirty-two; Lionel
Johnson, the talented English poet, critic, and essayist stricken by repressed
homosexuality, floundering from excesses in 1902; and Arthur Symons, the scholarly
versifier, critic, and editor of Savoy, sent adrift by a psychotic breakdown in 1909. The
heightened receptivity to an altering world during the fin de siècle era no doubt yielded a
proliferation of beautifully instinctual artworks; but when entering into his late phase as
an accomplished poet, Yeats had reason to jettison the impressionistic struggle he had
once glorified in images of the mythic hero Conchubar pitching battle with the tides.
Yet nostalgia pervades Yeats‟s recollection of the “revolt against Victorianism”
(183). He recounts the Rhymer‟s joyous refusal to indulge in “irrelevant descriptions of
nature,” in Tennyson‟s “scientific and moral discursiveness,” in Browning‟s
psychological penetration, and in “the poetical diction of everyone” (183). Nonetheless,
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when 1900 approached, “everybody got down off his stilts”1—or, perhaps more
accurately, finally tottered and collapsed from staring too long and hard at Pater‟s gemlike flame (185). Crucially, Yeats considers the Rhymer‟s dissipation less a generational
failure than the disastrous consequence following a long history of paying adherence to
passive mimesis: “The mischief began at the end of the seventeenth century when man
became passive before a mechanized nature”; it further gained currency when Stendhal
described a masterpiece as a “mirror dawdling down a lane” (200). So much had Yeats
aligned himself against passivity that he roundly dismisses from the Oxford collection
any war verse, insofar as “passive suffering is not a theme for poetry” (202).
Unsurprisingly, Yeats makes some rather idiosyncratic selections and omissions
when assembling the volume of all the “good” poets since Tennyson to represent modern
verse (predominantly Anglo-Irish, with the notable exception of several Indian poets).
Victorian and Georgian poets are indeed very much represented, as are Yeats‟s personal
acquaintances Margot Ruddock, with whom he was currently involved in a relationship,
his close Hindu friend Shri Purohit Swami, and the polymath Oliver St. John Gogarty,
who earns an unusual amount of space in both the introduction and volume. Rudyard
Kipling and Ezra Pound scarcely appear, a peculiarity Yeats attributes to royalty fees.
The perplexities that abound in Yeats‟s introduction to this modern verse
collection—his glorifying the Rhymers while marking their failures, his celebrating
modern verse even as he fails to represent it—marks the core of what I hope to explore in
this thesis, namely the manner in which Yeats conceived of “transition” to be intimately
1

Cf. Yeats‟s reflection on his early verse in “The Circus Animal‟s Desertion” published in Last Poems in
1939: “My circus animals were all on show/Those stilted boys, that burnished chariot,/ Lion and woman
and the lord knows what” (Collected 346-7).
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linked to principles of contradiction. This concern immediately invokes complications
related to the concept of modernity, complications Yeats foregrounds with the qualified
pronouncement, “I too have tried to be modern,” upon complaining that his
contemporaries lack rhythmical animation in their poems (Eliot‟s poetry is “grey, cold,
and dry”) (197).
In Bradbury and McFarlane‟s famous essay “The Name and Nature of Modernism,”
they insist that despite the overwhelming aesthetic styles under the rubric of modernism,
one can fruitfully sketch several affinities that all these trajectories share: a special selfconsciousness to aesthetic matters exceeding representation and humanism; the nearheroic championing of style and order out of linguistic chaos; and the strange
juxtapositions of the revolutionary and the conservative, the naturalistic and the
symbolic, the futuristic and the nihilistic, the rational and the irrational (46). Yet rather
than resolving these various contradictions that persist in any hazardous description of
modernism, Bradbury and McFarlane define the very nature of the periodization as the
“explosion” of these contradictory impulses that elude resolution (48). Thus even though
Yeats may not evince the formal pyrotechnics or subversive content of other notable
modernists, it would seem that the contradictory ethos of his life and poetics affords him
a secure place in the modernist canon. It is precisely how Yeats‟s aesthetic and political
contradictions inform his understanding of transition, and the degree to which these terms
can even be read as mutually reciprocal, that this study aims to address.
A veritable explosion of Yeats scholarship has swept academia in the last two years,
much of which has added to the already amassed number of contradictions in Yeats‟s life
and poetics and thereby challenging enthusiasts and newcomers alike to question even
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ready assumptions about the enigmatic poet. What is most compelling is the nature of
this resurgence: far from being a cohesive renascence, recent commentary has provided
remarkably varied thematic and methodological approaches. And yet much of this work
also seems unfashionably orthodox. In his review of recent work by senior commentators
Nicholas Grene, Ronald Schuchard, Helen Vendler, Richard J. Finneran and Warwick
Gould,2 George Bornstein tempers his praise of this recent scholarship with misgivings
over its retrograde nature: “methodologically the works display an indifference to
changes in literary study for the past three decades that leaves plenty of territory for
future scholars to investigate” (“Of What is Past” 610).
R.F Foster, for instance, completed his second volume of his biography, W.B. Yeats:
A Life in 2003, a grand achievement that catalogues the minutiae of Yeats‟s life in his
life as poet, playwright, occultist, dilettante, senator, journalist, stage-manager, and
witness to and participant in the most turbulent and factional generation of Irish history.
Borrowing an admonition from Michel Serres, Foster justifies his project by claiming
“that one can read from the work of art its conditions, but not—or not entirely—from the
conditions to the work of art” (xxvi).3 In her preface to Our Secret Discipline: Yeats and
Lyric Form, Helen Vendler implicitly opposes Foster‟s historical conceptualization by
ascertaining that poems “do no exist on the same plane as actual life”; they are neither
“votes” nor “propositions” nor “position[s]”; they are “products of reveries” (xiv).

2

Respectively: Yeats‟s Poetic Codes; The Last Minstrels: Yeats and the Revival of the Bardic Arts; Our
Secret Discipline: Yeats and Lyric Form; The Tower (1928): Manuscript Materials, ed., with Jared Curtis
and Ann Saddlemyer; “Influence and Confluence.” Yeats Annual No. 17: A Special Number.
3
Further: “What is needed is this kind of biography: not another exegesis of the poetry from a biographical
angle, not an analysis of development of his aesthetic theories, and especially not a study that ranges at will
across the work of nearly 60 years” (xx).
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Foster‟s “conditions” and Vendler‟s “reveries” are indicative of a hard-line separation
between lived experience and aesthetics that would seem to entirely run against the grain
of developments in literary and theoretical scholarship.
Yet it would be reductive to delimit the complexity of both these works as ancient
specters clinging to a oppositional model of history and aesthetics—reductive inasmuch
as it would overlook the complex differences of studies both on the close-reading,
aesthetic side of writers such as Vendler and Grene and on the side of historical models
such as Foster‟s and Schuchard‟s. Moreover, this strict binary dismisses the singular
dynamic of interiority and exteriority that takes on a particularly inflection in its divisions
within Yeats criticism. This is not altogether surprising: Richard Ellmann‟s pioneering
biography Yeats: The Man and The Masks established a wealth of nuanced contradictions
not only between the poet-as-speaker and the poet-as-public figure but also internally
within the aesthetic and political engagements themselves.
Much successive work, however, has resisted relying solely on “contradictory
models” not so much because these scholars hoped to conceptualize a more cohesive
figure by smoothing out or glossing over such contradictions, but, paradoxically, because
reading Yeats‟s life and work through contradictory topoi allows for his political and
aesthetic engagements to be reduced to the master-narrative of a Janus-faced figure. In
many ways this reservation extends beyond Yeats; too easily can contradictory principles
be mobilized to explicate and to account for the sweep of turbulent events that racked
Ireland during the early twentieth century: a Catholic majority valorizing its Protestant
martyrs, a resistance arrogating the very same nationalist discourse inherited by their
imperial subjugators, a unified cause splintering into Pro-treaty and anti-Treaty factions
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and erupting in Civil War.
The critical response to such ready formulations has been vast. Where Ellmann
brandishes a biographical pistol, Foster hauls a blunderbuss, describing in over twelvehundred pages the range of complexities occurring in Yeats‟s day-to-day involvement
that would render any over-arching narrative of contradiction egregiously presumptive.
Even strictly formal matters have been dramatically expanded: Helen Vendler‟s study, for
instance, exceeds by far any prior close-reading involvement, and the Cornell Yeats
series, by consolidating for the first time in photo-facsimile layout all of Yeats‟s
manuscripts flung worldwide in various library holdings, has made available the long and
complex process of revision to which Yeats subjected nearly every poem during both his
original composition and retrospectively after publication.
As exciting as this new “treasure trove” of material may seem, George Bornstein
concludes his review by admonishing eager Yeatsians to make the work “available and
interesting to a larger group of modernists, of literary scholars in general, and to the
literary-minded public” by “both explanatory work on the value of recent advances and
good judgment about how much detail is wanted or even can be tolerated” (“Of What is
Past” 614). What complicates Bornstein‟s injunction for Yeatsians to frame their
specialized discourse intelligibly to the broader current of modernism is the fact that
modernist studies itself is in something of a state of crisis, in which convenient period
markers such as spatial (metropolis), vertical (high/low art) and temporal (before 19221945) have been fruitfully loosened to account more accurately for the cultural and
material realities that have hitherto been ignored by the dominance of the mythic, if
convenient, Pound-Eliot nexus. In their article “The New Modernist Studies” in PMLA,
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Douglas Mao and Rebecca L. Walkowitz consider this broadening as the very definition
of recent advancements: “Were one seeking a single word to sum up transformations in
modernist literary scholarship over the last decade or two, one could do worse than light
on expansion” (82). What is exciting for some, however, is potentially debilitating to
those concerned that modernist studies will broaden to the point of losing its coherence as
a field, much as Yeats scholarship runs the risk of being led adrift by its own excess.
Yeats occupies a unique role in this expansive project, insofar as his position as a
“high modernist” has been duly established, even when he is situated in a marginal,
colonized position, and even though he is typified as a more conservative, traditional poet
who remained staunchly rooted, monologic, and nationalist. What secures Yeats‟s
standing in the modernist project it would seem is not the degree to which his poetry
resembled the more experimental projects surrounding him during his later stages, but the
degree to which his poetry progressed or evolved during his long poetic development,
roughly 1889-1943. Thus considered, Yeats would seem to trail in the wake of the
modernist project as a supplemental jetsam gauging the speeds and swells surging around
him while marking the contradictory voyage modernism had ostensibly embraced or even
surpassed. My principle aim here is to put to task the equivalency of “transition” and
“contradiction” by specifying their singular relation in Yeats‟ work. By first delineating
the nature of Yeats‟s aesthetic transitions, I hope to further comment on how Yeats‟s
notion of “antithetical” force lies at the heart of this complication. This notion of
antitheticality, I further argue, is part of a genealogy extending back to Friedrich
Nietzsche and William Blake, whose writings profoundly influenced Yeats‟s notion of
this contextually unbound, pre-subjective force inflecting his thematics, figural rhetoric,
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and method of composition. Finally, I will conclude by indicating how Yeats‟s
antithetical poetics inform his conception of the nascent Irish State during its most
dramatic period of transformation.

Chapter I. Toward a Romantic Modernity
Although Yeats never experimented with free verse, opting instead to master
traditional lyrical forms, he did gradually abandon the more conventionally poetic diction
and allusive imagery of his earlier collections Crossways (1889), The Rose (1893), and
The Wind Among the Reeds (1899). Yeats‟s use of a more austere language and direct
approach to his themes increasingly characterizes the poetry and plays of his middle
period, comprising the poetry volumes In the Seven Woods (1903), The Green Helmet
(1910), and Responsibilities (1914).
This stylistic shift climaxes in the concluding poem of Responsibilities, “A Coat,”
where Yeats announces that “there‟s more enterprise/In walking naked” than being
garbed with “embroideries/Out of old mythologies” (Collected 127). Yeats‟s claim to
divestment signals his aesthetic break from his early plaintive sonorities cloaked with
lulling fairies, frustrated loves and quests, Fenian cycles, and enigmatic roses; and this
break further inaugurates his entry into a terser style and sparer imagery characteristic of
modernist poetics. Significantly, Ezra Pound was instrumental in arranging for many of
the poems in Responsibilities, including “A Coat,” to be published in the first and fourth
volumes of Harriet Monroe‟s Poetry, a small magazine in Chicago at the forefront of
international modernism. This would mark Yeats‟s first publication outside Irish print.
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Beginning in 1913, Yeats had taken on Ezra Pound as a nominal secretary for three
winters at Stone Cottage in rural Sussex. There, they would compose poetry, squabble
over the finer points of Swedenborg and Noh drama, and hone their fencing skills in the
gardens and forests of Ashdown, all the while solidifying the generational link between
the established Rhymer and the budding Imagist twenty years the former‟s junior. Yet
the notion that Pound sped Yeats into modernity is misleading. Although Pound did
collaborate with Yeats on his composition of Responsibilities and encouraged his new
style, Yeats sourly dismissed many of Pound‟s minor corrections as “misprints” in a letter
confided to Lady Gregory (Letters 287). In fact, Pound did not initially consider Yeats so
much as malleable potential for the future as a crucial link to an elite artistic past.
However much he mocked Yeats for his aristocratic pretensions by dubbing him “The
Eagle,” Pound esteemed Yeats as an incarnation of the venerable Renaissance artist,
whose company he sought for access to private circles and premier versifiers, not to
mention shelter from the undiscerning masses. James Logenbach observes that not until
Pound abandoned his poetry of “shadows and dreams” did he begin to approve of Yeats‟s
newer style; in fact, “the actual turns of influence reveal Yeats as the dominant force”
(17, 19).4
When Pound‟s poetry became increasingly filled with what Yeats considered to be
Logenbach further details how Yeats‟s fascination with Irish folk legends and his systematic
study of magical studies in the Golden Hermetic Order Dawn encouraged, if not initiated,
Pound‟s corresponding study into eastern legends and traditions, notably Noh drama, which both
poets studied with increasing zeal (48). Further, although their life at Stone Cottage remained
isolated, George Moore‟s open mocking of Yeats‟s occult studies, and his caricaturing of Yeats
for defending aristocratic sensibilities, intensified Pound‟s distrust of the public, even if he, unlike
Yeats, held on to the belief that art contributed to a society‟s health (64). Pound‟s stimulated
investment in aristocratic culture and occult studies contributed to his esoteric ideal of the Image
that excluded the uninitiated masses: at Stone Cottage “an apparently apolitical discussion of
symbolism nurtured the social attitudes of the secret society of modernism” (77).
4
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aggressive clamor and political bombast, their friendship began to cool; by 1938, in his
second version of A Vision, Yeats would characterize Ezra Pound as one fixated on “all
sorts of temporary ambitions” that one defends with “superficial intellectual action, the
pamphlet, the violent speech, the sword of the swashbuckler” (214). It would seem that
Yeats‟s investment in Irish folktales and myth, in the occult, and in national interests
rendered him incapable of participating in the brand of modernism that Pound professed.
Despite Pound‟s praise for the lean, precise images and in some instances a loosened
meter in Responsibilities, many of these poems are nonetheless bogged down in the
morass of nationalist concerns. When, for instance, Yeats declares in “September 1913”
that “romantic Ireland is dead and gone/It‟s with O‟Leary in the ground,” he is ascribing
the loss of Irish heroes and patriotism to the rise of the mercenary materialism he felt was
rampant in Ireland (Collected 119). As such, Yeats attacks the ruthless employers who
locked out their workers in the General Strike of 1913 and the commercial entrepreneurs
who refused his appeal for funds to house Hugh Lane‟s collection of French Impressionist
painters. Yeats‟s aspersions against those who “fumble in a greasy till” strike a chord

with Pound‟s scathing satire of cultural dross in “Portrait d‟une Femme”; but, crucially,
where Pound lambasts the drivel espoused by women patrons for discouraging robust
invention, Yeats accuses modernity‟s coarse expediency of trammeling on the delicacy of
the Irish past.
What bears closer investigation, however, is less the degree to which Yeats did or
did not transition into a modern responsiveness or style that the way in which Yeats‟s
understanding of transition itself differed from Pound‟s mantra to “make it new.” Pound
was not merely exhorting novelty, but heralding the transmutation of antiquated
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materials, styles, and forms through changing circumstances: to make it anew. In
contradistinction, Yeats‟s understanding of transformation did not necessarily entail a
prior object or style that subsequently underwent transition or change; rather he
considered the purely differential element of transformation itself to always precede, and
indeed produce, the changing circumstances of an object, period, or form, along with the
subject that delineated them. In other words, Yeats did not consider transformation as
occurring from without, or as effected by the mediation of a poet, but as always
necessarily prior to the necessarily retrospective perception or act of creation. For Yeats,
change was the condition, not the effect.
This is not to deny the import of external influences in Yeats‟s aesthetic and political
development. Along with Pound‟s influence, and with his hardening take on the tragic
fate of the Rhymer‟s stated above, one might ascribe a swath of turbulent personal and
social events contributing to Yeats‟s impetus to “put some salt” in his poetics: his lifelong
love interest Maud Gonne had married the abusive lush John MacBride in 1903; his
Fenian political mentor John O‟Leary died in 1907; his Uncle George Pollexfen in 1910;
not to mention the outbreak of the First World War, the Easter Uprising of 1916, and the
brutal Civil War following treaty debates in 1922. Yet as important as these external
forces and influences impinging upon Yeats and eliciting his shift in poetics was how
Yeats affirmed the pre-subjective forces through and against which the contingencies of
his life and aesthetic were ordered and disordered. By pre-subjective I mean the
antithetical impulse, informed by Blake and Nietzsche, which traverses Yeats‟s poetics
irrespective of the circumstances or vagaries that beset him during his long poetic career.
This “antithetical impulse” is best defined as Yeats‟s refusal to resolve or synthesize
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the various contradictions of his life and aesthetic. As earlier noted, Ellmann‟s seminal
biography suggests that the organizing principle of Yeats‟s life was his sense of a divided
self; locked in contradictory impulses, Yeats‟s private dreams, mysticism, and poetic and
sexual urges were in combat with his public commitment to neo-Fenian politics and
serving Ireland (70-85). While Yeats certainly expressed such a struggle, what is
somewhat misleading is Ellmann‟s conclusion that the young Yeats, who is “dreamy,
poetic and self-conscious, and therefore unable to act with the spontaneity of the man of
action,” develops during his later years into a unified consciousness that has hardened
into rational self-assuredness (80).
More accurately, Yeats‟s sense of a bifurcated self persisted through his life rather
than solidifying in to the sobering personage Ellmann envisions. If in “Among School
Children” (1928), Yeats considered himself a “sixty-year old smiling public man,” he
would also ten years later emulate the “wild old wicked man” who finds solace from the
threats of divine power and death in Tantric desire: "I choose the second-best, / I forget it
all awhile / Upon a woman's breast" (Collected 216, 311). And if Yeats chose to doff his
embroidered cloak in “A Coat,” he will also admit in “The Circus Animal‟s Desertion”
(1938) that when composing “Wanderings of Oisin” (1899) he was “starved for the
bosom of his fairy bride,” who similarly wears a white vesture of “many a figured
embroidery” (347, 355). What is important to note is that Yeats‟s life and poetry did not
follow a simple trajectory from crooning enthusiast of Irish myth and fairyland to
statesman and philosopher, or from a romantic effusion to a hardened, modernist
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sensibility.5
Indeed, one of Yeats‟s most sustained contradictions was his complex
understanding of Romanticism. During his long career Yeats never relinquished his
identification as a belated Romantic, a sentiment he confirmed in “Coole and Bayllee,
1931”:
We were the last romantics—chose for theme
Traditional sanctity and loveliness;
Whatever‟s written in what poets name
The book of the people; whatever most can bless
The mind of man or elevate a rhyme (Collected 245)
Even though Yeats considered himself in line with the canonical literary Romantics,
notably Blake, Shelley, and Keats, he also considered this lineage transcending historical
epochs and nations, insofar as it encompassed the poetic quality of intensified vision
emulated by Spenser and Dante. Paradoxically, Yeats‟s universal Romanticism also
decisively became one “of the people”—that is, a de-Anglicized and nationalist aesthetic
informed by his Fenian mentor John O‟Leary—that led Yeats to conclude that “there is
no great literature without nationality, no great nationality without literature” (L. New
Island 12).6 For Yeats, Irish politics and poetry became inextricably intertwined, a fact at
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As Foster indicates, Yeats was not the timid, dreamy young man as he is often portrayed. Just
as Yeats infused his politics with his artistic vision, so too did his dealings with the occult hone
his political skills. Yeats rose rapidly in rank in every society and club to which he belonged, and
his ardor and temperament often let him dictate the terms and direction of those organizations.
When Yeats was only twenty-five, he was attacking moderate nationalists such as Gavan Duffy
and Thomas Rolleston who remained aloof from Yeats‟s mentor John O‟Leary. Yeats‟s poise
and audacity is evident in his panegyrics appearing in United Ireland, his battle for editorship in
Ireland‟s literary chronicles, and his equivocal and strategic dealings with the Irish Republic
Brotherhood (112-134).
6
At Yeats‟s Nobel Prize reception speech at the Royal Academy of Sweden, he urged cultural
nationalism as an alternative to parliamentary politics: “The modern literature of Ireland and
indeed all that stir of thought which prepared for the Anglo-Irish war, began when Parnell fell
from power in 1891” (Autobiographies 410). Controversies over Synge‟s The Playboy of the
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times overlooked in order to link Yeats to an Anglo-norm of literary modernism.
Commenting on the reception politics surrounding Yeats, Edna Longley argues that the
poet is not so much considered a modernist in Ireland as in North America, where “his
primary inclusion and exclusion” protects the “investment in the poetics of Pound and
Eliot” (162).
Rather than make a case for whether Yeats should be included or excluded from the
modernist project, I am interested in how his refusal to synthesize the various
contradictions of his life and aesthetic nuances his conception of transition, a conception
that paradoxically has little to do with the degree to which he or his poetics underwent
modification. That is, Yeats affirmed the labor of antithesis to such a febrile repetition
that the process of change, rather than its resolution or representation, generated the
possibilities for transformation. This understanding, I argue, can not be reductively
reduced to Yeats‟s retroactive stance against modernity, but neither can it be employed to
alter his image as one who was drawn its allure. To better understand what kind of
transformation this antithetical approach is capable of accomplishing, and why Yeats
employed it with such rhetorical force, we must first look back to two of Yeats‟s most
important predecessors.

Chapter II. Folding Symmetry: Blake, Nietzsche, and the Antithetical
If Yeats oscillated between the past and the present, between the Platonic and the
sensual, and between the conversational idiom of his poetry and the esoteric minutiae of

Western World and the strike and lockout of 1913 further necessitated Yeats taking a more
overtly political stance in his poems and plays (Bornstein “Yeats and Romanticism” 23).
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his occult dealings, he could follow Blake in locating value in the movement between
such contradictions.7 As he would do during his later enchantment with Nietzsche, Yeats
colored Blake with a pre-Raphaelite and Paterian hue; indeed, Arthur Symons, whose
The Symbolist Movement in Literature (1899) introduced the French symbolists to Yeats,
Eliot, and Pound, encouraged readers of his 1907 edition of William Blake to read the
prophet-poet in light of Nietzsche‟s philosophy. In the 1890s, when Yeats was immersed
in fusing fin de siècle art with its romantic predecessors, he collaborated with Edwin Ellis
to produce the three-volume Works of William Blake: Poetics, Symbolic, and Critical, to
which he contributed the majority of commentary on several important works, notably
the “Island in the Moon.”
Yeats especially admired Nietzsche and Blake for their mutual insistence of locating
value within the vitality and movement of thought and experience. In the section entitled
“The Necessity of Symbolism,” Yeats distinguishes between the “materialistic thinker
[who] sees „continuous‟” from the poet who “should see [in] „discrete degrees‟,” which
entails not only considering the mind “as companioning but as actually one with the
physical organism” (Works of Blake 236). Yeats discovered in Nietzsche and Blake
important precedents for the antinaturalism of the Symbolist poets, whose poetics sought
freedom from the representation of determined content, and whose refined sensibilities
and delight in rituals countered what Yeats considered the incapacitating moral and
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"Without Contraries is no progression/Attraction and/ Repulsion, reason and Energy, Love and
Hate, are/necessary to Human existence./ From these contraries spring what the religious
call/Good & Evil. Good is the passive that obeys Reason./ Evil is the active springing from
Energy./Good is Heaven. Evil is Hell" (MHH, Complete 66-7). Compare:“I have never put the
conflict in logical form, never thought like Hegel that the two ends of the see-saw are one
another‟s negation, nor that the spring vegetables were refuted when over” (A Vision 73).
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utilitarian ethos of Victorianism. The force of creative activity that Yeats admired in the
French Symbolists, and further located in Nietzsche‟s “Will to Power” and Blake‟s
“Imagination,” is a far remove from the objectified aesthetic of Pound, Eliot, and Joyce
that elicited Yeats‟s fascination and disdain. In the introduction to The Oxford Book of
Modern Verse, Yeats emphasizes his dislike for mimetic or naturalistic poetics:
It has sometimes seemed of late years […] as if the poet could at any
moment write a poem by recording the fortuitous scene or thought,
perhaps it might be enough to put into some fashionable rhythm—“I am
sitting in a chair, there are three dead flies on a corner of the ceiling.”
(xxvii)
To counter such illimitable naturalism, what Blake disparaged as “Vegetable Glass,”
(Complete 384) Yeats in part sought subjectivity in Berkeley, Zen Buddhism, Madame
Blavatsky‟s Theosophical Society, and the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn; yet, in
his contradictory fashion, those very inward turnings more often than not conflated with
his political and social dealings. Yeats followed Nietzsche and Blake‟s efforts to theorize
a dynamic subject that could transcend conventional dualistic thought and thereby
transcend the conventional morality, philosophy, and aesthetics predicated upon that
thought. Progression is only borne from conflict: active “evil” is always preferable to
passive “good.”8 More specifically, for both Nietzsche and Blake, it is not that either
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Although Nietzsche exults in warfare, and Blake, with his usual flair for hyperbole, claims he
would “sooner murder an infant in the cradle than nurse unacted desires” (Complete 34), it is
important to note that their willing of conflict has little to do with encouraging violence. Indeed,
for Blake, “energy” connotes all the beneficial and productive associations that the word “good”
usually suggests, and Nietzsche explicitly states that brute force is a debased expression of the
will to power. Similarly, if Yeats finds “terrible beauty” in the struggle of the Easter Uprising
(1916), he bemoans in “Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen” the atrocities committed by certain
members of the Auxiliaries and the Black and Tans during the pre-Treaty insurrection: “a
drunken soldiery/Can leave the mother, murdered at her door,/To crawl in her own blood, and go
scot-free” (Collected 108, 207). What is important to note is that for Blake, Nietzsche, and Yeats
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“evil” or “good” should gain priority, but that the artificial dichotomy is itself inimical to
the health of society. Thus Yeats praised Nietzsche‟s acerbic rhetoric that, like Blake‟s
salutary corrosives, dissolves the timid and perverting conscience of a stabilized
subjectivity. This radical collapse of subject and object, whether willed by the divine or
impersonal, however variable in tonality, influence, and degree, characterizes an
intellectual genealogy that leads up to the point of Yeats‟s famous inquiry: “Who can tell
the dancer from the dance?”
As Nietzsche demonstrates in his Genealogy of Morals, the righteous, the ascetic,
and the oppressed resent evil for being “the expression of strength, as if there were a
neutral substratum behind the strong man…But there is no such substratum; there is no
„being‟ behind doing, effecting, becoming” (481). Nietzsche‟s destabilizing of the
subject effects two principal results: 1) to demonstrate the futility of applying evaluative
categories on active processes incapable of cohering in a unified subject; 2) to rethink
judgment, meritorious acts, volition, and the subject as themselves constructs of selfpreservation, assertion, and will to power—not constructed in the sense of being
determined by social or cultural contexts, but of being shot through by expressive, presubjective forces.
Commenting on how Nietzsche‟s philosophy mediates through moments of
sensibility, the late philosopher Gilles Deleuze argues that the becoming of Nietzsche‟s
forces undergo a struggle between active forces that affirm and reactive forces that
negate, and whose qualities therefore can not be abstracted from their unfolding: the
progressive conflict does not manifest in physical violence but in a spiritual and mental
adjustment of consciousness whereby man surpasses himself.
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“becoming of force must not be confused with the qualities of force… [they] can be no
more extracted from their becoming than force itself can be separated from the will to
power” (63-4). In other words, Nietzsche is not simply advocating dominant and
aggressive forces that overpower their weaker counterparts; rather, he is locating the
differential element, or will to power, that necessarily precedes all expression of force.
The will to power, then, only manifests within evaluation, and so everything hinges on
how the interpreter or symptomologist affirms or negates this purely differential element
from which all distributions of power unfold through their becoming. What Nietzsche‟s
“Wille zur Macht” should not be confused with is Schopenhauer‟s “will to live,” which is
posited as more of a primordial impetus for survival, insofar as Nietzsche‟s drive to
power exceeds the value of life (thus asceticism as a jockeying for power).9 More
importantly, as an impersonal force, a “doer without a deed,” it exceeds subjectivity and
objectivity and is instead a qualitative encounter between forces.
In A Vision, Yeats will identify Blake and Nietzsche as the pre-eminent pair who
attempted to “establish, in the midst of our ever more abundant primary information,
antithetical wisdom” (48). Yeats distinguishes between objective primary forces
“stress[ing]…that which is external to mind” and subjective antithetical forces affirming
“our inner world of desire and imagination” (73). The antithetical mode, however, is not
presented as an inward retreat from the strife of the outside world; quite the contrary,
Yeats considers antithetical history as “an age of freedom, fiction, evil, kindred, art,
aristocracy, particularity, war,” while the primary is an age of “necessity, truth, goodness,
9

"Even the body within which individuals treat each other as equals ... will have to be an incarnate will to
power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize, become predominant—not from any morality or immorality but
because it is living and because life simply is will to power” (Beyond Good and Evil sec. 259).
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mechanism, science, democracy, abstraction, peace” (52).
More importantly than the abstract oppositions Yeats delineates in A Vision and
elsewhere is the underlying principle that the primary stagnates into unity, sameness, and
concord, whereas the antithetical expresses differentiation and discord—the sort of pure
differentiation that Nietzsche and Blake advocated. Far from being a mutually static
opposition, the primary and the antithetical inextricably whir through interlocking gyres,
wherein the apex of one touches the center of the other and thereby effects a perpetual
cycle of contraction and becoming. Following Nietzsche and Blake, Yeats identifies
consciousness with “conflict, not with knowledge” (A Vision 24), and in his poetry the
conflict between his soul and self, between his self and anti-self, undergoes a perpetual
surpassing, incited by the struggle of his will against the limits of the world. Blake‟s
Adam is at the “Limit of Contraction,” or the farthest man can fall while still retaining a
shred of Imagination in the “Mundane Shell” of the fallen earth; but Albion can cease
roaming his dens and creating categorical divisions once he celebrates the fiery, active
energy that unites creature with creator. Nietzsche‟s mythological Ṻbermensch, or
Overman, bounds above man in Thus Spoke Zarathustra as over a bridge and is beyond
our scope of consciousness when he learns to fully express the will power that laughs at
and dances above the nausea of nihilism, affirming life without seeking it in some
afterworld (310). Blake and Nietzsche, then, not only offer a prophylactic measure
against the ressentiment of man and his repression but also tap prophetic energy in order
to transform force into joyful creativity rather than watching it twist in anguish against
itself.
Identities coalesce when guilt and reflection stifle energy and activity, as when
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Albion, Blake‟s primeval man, concentrates on his passive shame or Selfhood and is
thereby fallen and divided by abstract thoughts, or Specters. In Responsibilities,
preceding the triumphant three-beat “A Coat,” Yeats experiences a recurring vision
(“Now as at all times I can see in the mind‟s eye”) of the frustrated Magi, whose
dissatisfaction and “stiff painted clothes” resemble a frigid crèche, and whose faces
“appearing and reappearing in the washed sky” resemble “rain-beaten stones” (Collected
126). Just as Albion‟s face blanches as he lacks the imagination to free himself from the
“fetters of ice shrinking together,” the Magi are unsatisfied with “Calvary‟s turbulence”
and wait eagerly for “the uncontrollable mystery on the bestial floor” (126). It seems that
they cannot summon the horrible dispensation of the “rough beast” who “slouches
towards Bethlehem” in “The Second Coming,” insofar as their eyes are transfixed to the
sky as they await a transcendent apocalypse to be delivered from without. What they
lack is the fiery forge of Los hammering blood and fury through their hearts in order to
progress to another conscious state, whereby Orc can be borne into the world with
creative passion, inner vision, and energy to turn the Mundane Shell inside out.
For Blake, art is revelation, and its purpose is not to emulate nature or to refract it
with vague impressions but to recreate it by channeling energy into form. Yeats,
however much a visionary, battled tooth and claw for the privileged moment, straining to
master his metrics and choosing to revise many of his poems multiple times: “Metrical
composition is always very difficult to me, nothing is done upon the first day, not one
rhyme is in its place; and when at last the rhymes begin to come, the first rough draft of a
six-line stance takes the whole day” (Autobiographies 135). C.K. Stead admires Yeats‟s
ability to complete a coherent body of work, in contradistinction to Pound‟s disintegrated
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vision in the unfinished Cantos; but Stead qualifies his praise by further claiming that
Yeats‟s “prodigious efforts to make colloquial modern speech fit the conventional line
and rhyme patterns” resulted in “supreme eloquence, but as often the labour showed, and
the eloquent and merely laboured appeared side by side in the same poem” (229).
If Yeats‟s verse had a habit of showing at the seams, “the stitching and unstitching”
of his drudging efforts effect an ongoing process of willing and overcoming that is
fundamental to his poetics. Far before meeting Pound, Yeats had been striving to
dissociate his image as a curious survivor of the Rhymer‟s Club, whose notable members
of the 1890s had begun to die from their excesses—or, in Arthur Symons‟s case, to
become mad—and consequently earning from Yeats the retrospective designation as the
“Tragic Generation.” Indeed, Yeats‟s stylistic shift is already conspicuous in the first of
his so-called middling poetry collections, In the Seven Woods (1903). In residence at the
Coole Estate with lifetime friend and patron Lady Gregory during its composition, Yeats
sought momentary respite from his personal sadness, from the loss of ancient Celtic
Ireland, and from his disgust over the recent ascension of Edward VII.
In the eponymous poem, Yeats admonishes his previous anguishing over his
ineffectual attempts to consummate with his lifetime love pursuit Maude Gonne and
accordingly pledges to “put away/The unavailing outcries and the old bitterness/That
empty the heart” (Collected 77). Much of the drama of the poem, and indeed the entire
collection, owes to Yeats‟s eschewing of his pre-Raphaelite predilections and his imagery
that he has come to associate with his impotent protestations. Even if Yeats could
tentatively marry Aestheticism with Symbolism, he became increasingly critical of what
he considered Lionel Johnson‟s and Arthur Symons‟s commitment to a passive and
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impressionistic subjectivity. Accordingly, at the start of the twentieth century his poetry
moves away from Pater‟s aesthetic idealism to a close-knit vitality of body, imagination,
and mind that could accommodate a more robust poetics by placing heavier demands on a
subject that creates rather than one that parrots back experience.10
Paradoxically, Yeats considered the creative act both empowering and enervating.
A year before Maud Gonne announced her marriage to John MacBride, Yeats composed
“Adam‟s Curse,” in which he sustains his most accomplished meditation on labor and
spontaneity. William Wenthe observes that in The Wind and the Reeds Yeats contrasts
the labor of verse with the idle and ideal world of beauty; but that by 1902, Yeats
considers both composition and beauty to be in fallen states and are therefore in need of
labor to realize them (32). As Yeats the speaker insists, “It‟s certain that no fine
thing/Since Adam‟s fall but needs much labouring” (81). Yeats is in part demonstrating
how the naturalness and grace of the completed form can only be achieved by laboring
over metrical and aural nuances. Further, he is expressing Castilogne‟s sprezzatura, the
necessary calculation behind the mask of spontaneous nonchalance. Indeed, the poem‟s
construction tenuously balances form and its relaxation: the first two stanzas are
presented in quasi-sonnets whose rigidness of heroic couplets is loosened by their slant
rhymes (i.e.: “summer‟s end│clergymen…trade enough│name of love”). Such are the
complications with which Yeats wrested when pursuing Maud Gonne: How can one
express love as the fruit of much labor? And how can that labor, in turn, retain its heat of

In 1906, Yeats wrote that “we should ascend out of common interests, the thoughts of the
newspapers, of the market-place, of men of science, but only so far as we carry the normal,
passionate, reasoning self, the personality as a whole” (Essays & Intrd. 272). Significantly, for
Blake perception is not sensory but mental, which is synonymous with the imaginative.
10
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spontaneity and naturalness?
At the poem‟s end, Yeats evokes Shelley‟s eternal moon, which shines resplendent
through the “dying embers of evening” but also necessarily “hollow” and “worn” from
being “washed by time‟s waters” ( Collected 81). Yeats‟s distrust with platonic idealism
not only suggests fallen labor as an alternative but also signals his association with the
artistic “martyrs” who create in opposition to the “noisey set/Of bankers, schoolmasters,
and clergymen” who would consider him an “idler” (80). The active spontaneity of life
has been divided into a passive division between labor and beauty, naturalness and form,
poetry and industry, Yeats and Maud Gonne. “Our fallen world,” Yeats laments, “has
separated subject and object” (Explorations 306). Rather than ascend to ideal forms, or
descend in to the mire of the laborious act, Yeats simultaneously defends art and beauty
from being a facile enterprise while lamenting their tarnished subjection to time and toil.
However much Yeats celebrates the laborious cycles of Los to forge a perfect form, he
equally aches for the divine vision that will deliver him from the grinding process into
Jerusalem. And it is precisely this point of strain between Nietzsche and Blake—that is,
the antithesis besetting itself— that will intensify Yeats‟s poetics to a degree of frenetic
transformation.

Chapter III. Forging a System: The Labor of Los(s)
The crucial difference between Blake‟s and Nietzsche‟s philosophy is that the former
hoped to restore man via the collapse of perspectives in to the true knowledge of vision,
whereas the latter hoped to surpass man by dramatizing the perspective play of truth and
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untruth through their unwinding. Nietzsche bluntly states: “The will to a system is a lack
of integrity‟ (Twilight Idols 25). Blake‟s Los proclaims: “I must Create a System, or be
enslav‟d by another Mans” (Jer. Complete 10/153). Los‟s declaration, of course, places
due emphasis on the verb and the private forging of that system (the next line follows: “I
will not Reason and Compare: my business is to Create”). Nonetheless, I consider
Blake‟s and Nietzsche‟s opposing views on system-building to have had significant
consequences for Yeats when he began to formulate his own all-encompassing system in
A Vision. Containing geometrical, astrological, psychological, metaphysical, and
historical components, A Vision is Yeats‟s tour de force, in which he and his wife,
George Hyde Lees, are visited by “instructors,” whose enigmatic comments are
communicated through Lees‟s gift for automatic writing. As he works to translate these
instructions, Yeats introduces his interlocking gyres and the four faculties revolving
around the twenty-eight lunar phases through which personalities incarnate.
In part, Yeats‟s construction of a totalizing system stemmed from his anxieties of the
communist and fascist debates on the continent, of which he became increasingly aware
while serving as Senator in 1922, the moment he began the book‟s conception. Miranda
Hickman suggests that Yeats‟s fear of “Jacobin excesses of the times” lead him to
structure a system that could “restore balance and moderation” (210). Yet she further
notes that if Yeats found solace in acting as a medium for his instructors, he “energized
[this] passivity with a visionary power and the Vorticist precision of geometry” (188).
Vorticist art resonated with Yeats‟s earlier geometrical shapes and symbols he found in
Mathers‟s Order of the Golden Dawn and other Theosophy clubs, but the crucial
difference is that Vorticism enabled Yeats with a more aggressive and precise stance than
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serving as a vessel for the visitation of spirits.11 If Yeats were to construct an antithetical
system, it would need to have the vibrancy and exactness of Blake‟s.
Interestingly, among the several prefaces to A Vision, Yeats includes “A Packet for
Ezra Pound,” in which he details his relaxed exile with Pound in Rapallo. Following
Blake‟s opposition to friendship, and Nietzsche‟s suspicion of it, Yeats marks Pound as
his spiritual antagonist. In one of the various scenes relating their interaction, Yeats
recalls Pound‟s explanation of how he composed the Cantos, thematically, yet arranged
them randomly. Despite his rebuff that “Pound‟s aesthetic is in direct opposition of
mine,” Yeats admits his fascination with what he calls the “mathesis,” a Renaissance
form wherein numbers and geometrical forms are employed mathematically in order to
structure symmetrical images, yet like a fugue also blends “seemingly irrelevant
details…when taken up into [the] imagination” (5). Although Yeats hopes to emulate the
incisiveness of Pound‟s system, he nonetheless wants to leave room for “odd corner[s]”
and “botch[es] of tone and colour” (5).
Hazard Adams argues that A Vision does not complete a systematization of poetic
symbols, nor is that the project‟s goal; rather, Yeats dramatizes how his struggle to
formulate a system of creation, personality, life, death, and history is a necessary failure,
because in the end Yeats is not in a communal relationship with his instructors but in an
antithetical strife (Contrary Vision 43). Indeed, the instructors continually argue with
In his provocative conclusion to the “Introduction” to A Vision, Yeats remains indecisive as to
whether he is actively formulating his system or passively mediating it: “Some will ask whether I
believe in the actual existence of my circuits of sun and moon…To such a question I can but
answer that if sometimes, overwhelmed by miracle as all must be when in the midst of it, I have
taken such periods literally, my reason has soon recovered; and now that the system stands out
clearly in my imagination I regard them as stylistic arrangements of experience comparable to the
cubes in the drawing of Wyndham Lewis and to the ovoids in the sculpture of Brancusi. They
have helped me to hold together in a single thought reality and justice” (24-5).
11
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Yeats, with one another, and oftentimes appear confused and frustrated. Much absurdity
abounds as George dreams she were a cat lapping milk, and Yeats attempts to “drive it
away by making the sound one makes when playing at being a dog to amuse a child”
(10). However much irony and self-debasement Yeats includes, there is nonetheless
something sinister about the instructors, especially when they warn Yeats that they will
try to deceive him and threaten violence. Once completed, Yeats‟s system seems to hold
a dogmatic authority over the images of his poems, the primary impulse; but it soon
becomes clear that the antithetical impulse, fueled by the instructors, is perpetually
undermining the primary one. The instructors are closely related to what in Per Amica
Silentia Lunae Yeats calls Daimons: indifferent, superhuman passions that express
themselves to one another and that the individual often confuses for his or her own.
Yeats oftentimes identifies the antithetical with the image, but every time the
primary attempts to concretize these images via abstract thought, Yeats seems to perform
the same theatrical treachery of the instructors (or Frustrators, as he occasionally calls
them). Information is withheld, rapid shifts in thought accompany any tentative
explanation of symbolic order, and every mapping of gyres and tinctures is maddeningly
complicated: Yeats introduces larger wheels of gyres; principles that in turn govern the
faculties; a solar wheel that interpenetrates the lunar one; a vague overview of the Sphere
and the soul in transit; and a system of world history that divides historical periods into
phases and personalities. Yeats undergoes an antithetical quest, one in which the poet
learns that primary experience will always be by itself insufficient. Yeats must accept
that the Will (desiring faculty of being) will always remain antithetical to the Mask,
which connotes for him both the object of desire and the consciously theatrical style
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accompanying the pursuit of that object.
Like Blake and Nietzsche, Yeats‟s employment of theatrical gestures dramatizes a
movement of thought. Where Nietzsche celebrated Wagner‟s operatic and mythic
performances, and Blake piped songs and hymns complemented his visual plates, Yeats‟s
rhythms and psaltery resonated through the movements and the images of other poems as
he constantly reconsidered them from different viewpoints and states of mind.12 Yeats‟s
system, then, is itself an anti-system, or more precisely a dramatic staging of the
momentary reification of thought and that thought being caught up and washed away in
its own movement. Calvin Bedient concludes that an abundance of form “riled and
stifled the Beast in [Yeats]” while an excess of “Sensation frightened even the madmen in
him”; fluctuating between sensation and form, “his art pings with the comprehensiveness
of his magnificent indecision” (142). In the “Double Vision of Michael Robartes,” Yeats
succinctly captures what Joyce called chaosmos, or Blake the vortex, the movement
within the monumental: “Mind moved yet seemed to stop/As „twere a spinning top” (87).
Nowhere does Yeats dramatize the struggle between symmetry and its antithesis so
vibrantly as in “Sailing to Byzantium” (1927). Here, the aged poet feels rejected from
the temporal world of love and “sensual music” and therefore resolves to turn toward
“monuments of unageing intellect” (123). To elevate his soul into the “artifice of
eternity,” however, hardly seems a suitable alternative, for once his heart and desire are
consumed away, the poet is reduced to yet another emblem impressed in the golden
12

For an account of how Yeats, the prolific actress Florence Farr, the Bengalese poet Tagore, and
others pressured the Imagists to never let them “substitute a visual for an aural paradigm,” see
Scuchard (esp. 256-83). Pound, Hulme, and notable imagists such as Aldington, H.D., Fletcher,
Lawrence, and Flint retained the quality of rhythm and cadence within their poetry and criticism
that Yeats impressed upon them so fervently.
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mosaic of the Hagia Sophia among a litany of venerable yet impotent men. The speaker‟s
attitude toward the natural cycle, however, is immediately ambivalent: “the young/In one
another‟s arms,” and the “salmon-falls” and “mackerel-crowded seas,” phrases that ring
lushness through their entrancing elongated vowels, are offset by a more detached, almost
scientific observance, of “fish, flesh, fowl,” that is “begotten, born, and dies,” whose
staccato monosyllables and alliterations convey a tone of disgust. Helen Vendler, who
considers Yeats struggling between “spiritual excitement and sexual torture and the
knowledge that they are somehow inseparable,” astutely observes that the poem unfolds
in four numeric stations, each of which offering a modulation of song, the first two
stanzas sublimating horizontally to the cathedral, the last two moving vertically to the
palace (48). The rapid shift in tonality in location between each station, the spatiotemporal crisis, is monitored by the ottava rima stanzas of regular rhyme scheme
(abababcc). Ostensibly, Yeats favors the trappings of time and the sensuality of the
drowsy emperor in lieu of gilded eternity.
In Blake‟s America, Europe and the Song of Los, he couples his persistent theme of
attaining liberty through revolutionary action with an equally potent theme of man‟s
apocalyptic resurrection. Man is trapped in the natural world, whose cycle parallels the
perpetual mental strife between the imprisoned Orc spasmodically overthrowing the
tyrannical thundergod of moral power and rational distribution, Urizen. Yet because Orc
and Urizen share a corrupted view of space, time, and life as cyclical, they both
accordingly fail to pierce these cumbrous wheels with the imaginative vision that can
only accompany the eighth eye of the calamitous but redemptive descent of the
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Messiah.13 Yeats‟s crucial departure from Blake, Harold Bloom argues, owes to Yeats‟s
misinterpretation of the covering cherub, far from a means of redemption for Blake, as
the mask of the created form from which the uncreated spirit manifests (see esp. 69-74).
Yeats‟s refusal to enter Byzantium—Blake‟s Golgoonoza—attests to how Yeats
conceived the poet as creating through Beulah. This is to say that Yeats may have very
well inherited the dialectical structure of Blake‟s cosmos; but far from desiring to unite
with his shadow, Yeats found its elusive chase to be fruitful, whereas Blake considered
the Spectre vainly pursing its Emanation to be a fallen state of natural religion (i.e.
Deism) that he so vehemently denounced. For Blake, the creation of the physical world
is paradoxically enough man‟s fall, insofar as man no longer perceives as God but
perceives as an organism in an environment; this division between subject and object is
what Blake calls the world of Generation (Ulro, Hell).
Unlike Blake, whose prophetic Eyes of God ensure a process through and out of
time into the inner vision of dynamic eternity, Yeats can only attain momentary glimpses
of apocalypse and the eternal before he is, as in “The Isle of Innisfree,” jolted back to the
material reality of the “pavement grey.” Yeats can never access the city of eternal vision
but can only strive toward it, remaining trapped in the false eternal wheel of human
creation and the regenerative world, what Blake deemed Beulah. Yeats‟s tower and
winding stair, roughly analogous to Blake‟s Golgonooza, aims to transcend the earthly
province but necessarily remains rooted in its aspiration: if the tower evokes the ancient
towers of astronomy and human enlightenment achieved by closer proximity to the
Northorp Frye provides the best account of the “Orc Cycle,” through which Orc enacts the
dual-role of the Promethean revolutionary spirit and the cyclical rebirth of Adonis (210). See also
Rachel Billigheimer‟s Wheels of Eternity, esp. 98-104.
13
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mythical progenitors of the sun and moon, it also suggests the confusion and dispersal of
articulation wrought by the Tower of Babel.
Yeats‟s decline into the gilded eternity of Jerusalem in the fourth stanza of “Sailing
to Byzantium” is complicated by his song‟s incarnation into a mechanical bird, forged by
Los‟s “hammered gold and gold enameling” in the Emperor‟s palace. The emperor,
whose drowsiness is sensualized by the mechanized bird, is somewhat tamed by the
unsexualized “lords and ladies of Byzantium” that keep his court. Yeats‟s concession
that “Once out of nature I shall never take/My bodily from any natural thing” is fraught
with ambiguity. First, does this suggest the possibility of active appropriation of a form
that is no longer attainable? Or the passive willingness (in the sense of “to take on”) of
an acceptance that has been denied? This is further complicated by the “nature” under
scrutiny. Is Yeats suggesting the nature in the sense of the material, natural elements and
cycles, or “nature” in the sense of the poet‟s habit or deliberation?
If in “Sailing Byzantium,” Yeats tenuously synthesizes Blake‟s golden song with
Nietzsche‟s imperious court, he will repeat his approach in his diptych-response
“Byzantium,” not to enter in the “glory of changeless metal” that the “moon [has]
embittered, but to remain at the rush of its portal, in the “blood and mire” of complexities
(249). And if in “Sailing to Byzantium,” Yeats becomes the golden bird representing the
eventual destiny of his soul, he now meditates on an image of Hades‟ bobbin wheel
suffocating his body in “mummy cloth.” The poem hinges on whether the speaker will
repudiate his afterlife visions, or consent to the furnace of spiritual agony where his
dance will consume the complexities of fire and blood.
Poised between the monumental fashioned into permeable gold and the terrible,
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sensual tumult of “fury and mire of human veins,” between laboring and transcendence,
Yeats‟s own antithetical impulse undergoes its own climax. Los has returned with a
vengeance: “The smithies break the flood, /The golden smithies of the Emperor!” But
the speaker‟s dance does not free him from the booming forge; like Nietzsche‟s (and
indeed Mallarme‟s) dance, the speaker affirms the whirling movement of insoluble
contraries, from whose movement “fresh images beget” rather than solidifying in to a
mosaic, or in to the pure Image that Pound advocated. Yeats refuses to negate the flux of
discord or to synthesize its frenzy into concord; rather he wills the antithetical to undergo
its own perpetual antitheticality that generates—and indeed is the condition for—
transformation.
When Pound sought Yeats‟s company, he praised the soft cadences of the Celtic
Twilight as “Naught but the wind that flutters in the leaves.” But Yeats‟s Gaelic word for
wind, “Sidhe,” also connotes otherworldly beings whose mad gusts Yeats associates with
dance of the daughters of Herodias, and who disturb the mummy-wheat over the cairn
hill and the burial mound. Like Shelley‟s wind, Yeats‟s Sidhe is at once a balmy and
destructive whirl through the concordant and discordant faculties. In his Pisan Cantos,
Pound would recall the older poet incanting “The Peacock”:
“…So that I recalled the noise in the chimney
as it were the wind in the chimney
but was in reality Uncle William
that had made a great Peeeeacock
in the proide ov his oiye
had mad a great Peeeeeeeacock in the…”
If Yeats‟s disembodied voice haunts Pound, not to mention Eliot and Auden, it is not
simply because his chanting is an old and mellow breeze from the past but because his
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cadences and rhythms whisper in their ears a forceful antitheticality that inhabits, before
surging through, pre-existing monuments.

Chapter IV. Towering Vacillations: Becoming Political
Yeats held that Blake was convinced
That the things his opponents held white were indeed black, and the things
they held black were white […] that all busy with government are men of
darkness and „something other than human life.‟ One is reminded of
Shelley, who was the next to take up the cry, though with a less abundant
philosophic faculty, but still more of Nietzsche, whose thought flows
always, though with an even more violent current, in the bed Blake‟s
thought has worn. (Essays 68)
We have seen how Yeats employed an antithetical mode in his aesthetics in order to
effect the highest pitch of concentration and transformation; skimming along the rush of
Nietzsche and Blake, and setting even these predecessors on one another, Yeats
harnessed the transformative potential of negation and tore asunder the golden mosaic
wall that would petrify his movement in a hagiographic representation. What remains to
be discussed, however, is the degree to which this contradictory principle, brimming with
potential through his poetry, translates to his political and social involvement that,
however much relegated in his essays as secondary to his poetry, remained a focal point
throughout the course of his life. Even when dwelling on the nature of Irish poets in the
introduction to the Oxford Book of Modern Verse Yeats will conclude: “We are what we
are because almost without exception we have some part in public life in a country where
public life is simple and exciting” (189). In closing, I would like to point to several
contradictions within Yeats‟s nationalist efforts and suggest how his understanding of
“antithetical” transition inflects these complications.
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We are immediately greeted with two dangerous consequences: 1) that Yeats‟s
concept of antitheticality led to beautiful transformative effects in his poetry but is
ultimately ineffectual in political life, as it runs a platform of non-committal vacillation 2)
or, more consequentially that this hyper-negation, when applied to the social realm, leads
one to the worst interpretation of “will to power,” whereby the masses are eschewed for
the noble and the upright—the path of social Darwinism that arises from aligning with
elitist art and leads directly to fascist Irish ascendancy. These consequences themselves
point to an ongoing contradiction within the modernist enterprise itself: if one were to
follow Frank Kermode and Georg Lukács in condemning modernist art for failing to
represent the reality of material and class struggle, the inevitable problem persists as to
how an artist could be disparaged for being both aesthetically insular, what Astradur
Eysteinsson calls the “rage of order” whereby the artist shapes the vicissitudes of life and
history into the timeless unity of mythic representation and aesthetic that New Criticism
and Russian Formalism would find so attractive, while simultaneously defining this type
of aesthetic as subverting some sort of social normative even as it seems to withdrawal
from it altogether (42).
One way out of this dilemma is to refuse to reduce the literary movement
modernism to being synonymous with the social, cultural, and technological shifts that
better fall under the rubric of modernization. So where critics such as Lukács complain
that modernism distorts reality and introduces chaos when representing the world,
Eysteinsson argues that this is precisely the point: rather than read in terms of extreme
subjectivity or in terms of impersonal aesthetics, modernism expresses a crisis of the
subject relating or representing the outside world; to ignore this is to think that
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modernism and modernization are but mutually reinforcing phenomena when in fact the
former oftentimes functioned as a blockage to or a critique of the latter in the form of a
revolt against capitalist-bourgeois teleology and the failed project of unfettered liberalism
(67).
In short, a withdrawal into aesthetics does not necessarily entail aloofness from a
privileged vantage: this applies above all to Yeats, whose Neo-Fenian brand of politics
called for a nationalist literature that could not be reduced to proselytizing (thus his
reservations with some of Pound‟s work and with many of the popular Irish nationalist
poets such as Gavan Duffy), for such a response is too easily commercialized and too
readily turned to fodder when inspiring foolish decisions. Although Yeats came to
sympathize with Patrick Pearse and the others executed during the failed uprising of
1916, he nevertheless would harbor guilt, admittedly overly scrupulous, over the possible
sedition aroused by his more pointedly nationalist works: “Did that play of mine send
out/Certain men the English shot?" (Collected 227).
Before commenting with more detail on how Yeats‟s concept of antitheticality
informs his political encounters, it might be useful for me to frame this issue around
Theodor Adorno‟s concept of the interrelation of art and society, one that offers an
explicit critique of the development of high liberal capitalism since the 19th century, and
one that offers the most rigorous account of art operating through autonomous negativity.
For although, like Lukács, Adorno does not consider the autonomy of aesthetics to have
any functional value, intriguingly for Adorno this very uselessness itself serves a type of
function: forming a negative image of an over-determining impulse of rationalist,
capitalist society. Certainly in Adorno‟s lifetime he witnessed society being dominated
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by exchange value, but it is crucial to note that he did not consider this as a recent
phenomenon: rather, the beginning of human history put society on a trajectory toward
the reduction of all experiential qualities to quantitative equivalences. This is because
the drive toward self-preservation, which began as the desire to dominate nature, began to
pervade all spheres of social life as an increasingly insidious form of instrumental reason.
Together with Horkheimer, Adorno argues in Dialectic of Enlightenment that
although the concept of reason strives to uphold “the idea of a free, human, social life,” it
nonetheless is committed to the “ratio of capital” that strives for the most effective means
to manipulate and exploit nature (18). Thus, a dynamic of social power is put in place a
priori whereby instrumental reason prevails, a reason “which adjusts the world for the
ends of self-preservation and recognizes no function other than the preparation of the
object from mere sensory material in order to make it that material of subjugation” (64).
All relations, as quantifiable, accordingly take on a standardizing function that strives to
reduce everything to the same universal principle: equivalence. Here is Adorno‟s alleged
pessimism toward the culture industry and toward any hope of unmediated agency, for
the individual is not in a position of relative freedom against the backdrop of some social
context but part of a general subject whose historical dialectics already sweep one up in a
project of quantified domination.
Thus Adorno follows the Hegelian axiom that art shares a relation with social totality,
but the crucial difference is that Adorno does not consider art to reflect on or
communicate with society, a process that would enable both terms to undergo sublation;
instead Adorno figures art as perpetual negation that resists society and its ossified forms
of language and homogeneity. Indeed, the very indeterminateness of art reflects social
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conditions through its negative performance, causing the logic and rationality of an
objectively reified world to reflect its irrationality. Thus in order to express the
negativity of a determinate subjective experience, the artist must construct a form of
radical subjectivity rather than one with the shape of a “rationalized” objective (which
would house an arche-subjectivity even as it claimed to eschew it).
What I have delineated thus far is but a simplified sketch of Adorno‟s highly complex
critique, but this excursus nonetheless has enabled an inflection of our original question
involving transition and transformation. Following Adorno‟s model of negative
dialectics, and Yeats‟s model of antithetical poetics, our central concern becomes less
about the transition between two constituent terms (x becoming y) than the nature of the
becoming that circulates through the entire series. Put differently, our concern is less
about identifying or representing an ethos or artifact that transgresses, subverts, or
outright opposes a preceding norm or habitual methodology than tracing the rhythms and
contours resonating through the process of the overcoming itself. If dialectics is the
repetitious movement of change, one can not simply move beyond it, for to do so would
be to participate in that which is ostensibly dismissed. But, following Deleuze, whose
account of Nietzsche‟s symptomology I traced earlier, one might locate a distinct or
singular rhythm of movement that, if not entirely different from negation, is nevertheless
irreducible to it.14
To make this more concrete, consider Yeats‟s celebrated “Leda and the Swan”:

14

For a longer discussion, see the “Introduction: Rhizome” from A Thousand Plateaus, where Deleuze and
Guattari conclude: “Between things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the
other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other
away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle” (25).
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A sudden blow: the great wings beating still
Above the staggering girl, her thighs caressed
By the dark webs, her nape caught in his bill,
He holds her helpless breast upon his breast.
How can those terrified vague fingers push
The feathered glory from her loosening thighs?
And how can body, laid in that white rush,
But feel the strange heart beating where it lies?
A shudder in the loins engenders there
The broken wall, the burning roof and tower
And Agamemnon dead.
Being so caught up,
So mastered by the brute blood of the air,
Did she put on his knowledge with his power
Before the indifferent beak could let her drop?
Where the “Second Coming” introduces the flight of hawk to signify the whirling ascent
to apocalypse, “Leda and the Swan” recounts a nascent descent, namely the beginning of
epic history. Leda, being raped by Zeus in the disguise of a swan, lays eggs that will
hatch into Clytemnestra and Helen and the war-gods Castor and Polydeuces, thereby
leading to the Trojan War and its aftermath (“The broken wall, the burning roof and
tower/ And Agamemnon dead”). This myth, not surprisingly, plays a role in the larger
historical cycles that Yeats traces in A Vision, but what is more conspicuous than the
mythical or historical momentousness of this gestation is the sheer violence and sensual
imagery it invokes. Ostensibly, a perfect antithesis is before us: Zeus appears in all his
“feathered glory,” with “great wings” and “brute blood,” while Leda is but a “helpless
breast” “staggering” before the assault,” her only defense being “terrified vague fingers”
(Collected 237).
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But in this Petrarchan sonnet a strange reversal occurs after Zeus‟s ejaculation
(“shudder in the loins”) completes the octave. In the concluding sestet, the speaker asks
if Leda “put on his knowledge with his power” before she was ignobly dropped (237).
This final rhetorical question, like the ones concluding “A Second Coming” or “Among
School Children,” expresses far more wonder and unaffected confusion than the
rhetorical questions preceding it, which seem imperative, even conveying outrage: “How
can those terrified vague fingers push/ The feathered glory from her loosening thighs?”
A common reading of the poem holds that Zeus descending on Leda is analogous to the
rush of modernity befalling mankind, an exhilarating, if degrading, experience that one
can only contain or master by immortalizing the violent movement within art. But this
would only attribute the force of the encounter to Zeus, when in fact it becomes
increasingly apparent that poem moves toward a more complex commingling of power
that is caught up in the “white rush.” Within the dialectical struggle between Zeus and
Leda, aggressor and victim, violation and sublimation, the encounter itself so vividly
captured here seems to sweep up both characters in its own event, or even as the
becoming undergone is decoded, as it fails to resolve the situation or to sublate Leda (she
is dropped to begin the conflict anew). The “becoming” of this encounter, as we noted
with Nietzsche‟s “deeds without doers” and Blake‟s imaginative imperative, is a singular
expression that can only parse out a subject or object when the dynamic is congealed and
the movement or „singular rhythm‟ is altogether subtracted.
What originally seems like a purely aesthetic concern, however, takes on particular
import and inflection when traced through Yeats‟s political involvement with Ireland‟s
struggle for independence and its nascent Free State. For in its singular transitory
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development it essentially grappled with two contradictory trajectories: the abstract
notion of liberalism that secured individual and natural right and the effort to construct a
notion of Irish citizenship with a traceable historical and cultural identity. Yeats‟s
nationalism advocated that Ireland paradoxically become a modern state that would
simultaneously maintain its singularity. As Michael North notes, in his seminal The
Political Aesthetics of Yeats, Pound, and Eliot, Yeats was a “Victorian and still
something of the nineteenth-century liberal he loved to hate, [and] Yeats suffered these
conflicts as a personal quarrel, an internal contest between individualism and nationalism,
right and duty, freedom and history” (13).
In this sense, Yeats pursued the imaginary ideal of an Ireland that would achieve
the impossible Hegelian resolution that realizes the coincidence of personal uniqueness
and social harmony. Additionally, Yeats advocated nationalism from a colonial vantage
point, one where he was in danger of either embracing the enlightened progress of British
imperialistic modernization or of retreating into an authentic Celtic voice that can only
speak as nativist.15 But given the vacillations within Yeats‟s political life, as within his
aesthetics, this project would never find resolution and would instead lead him through
tumultuous participation in nearly the entire range of possible political alignments at his
disposal. As Yeats aptly stated, “Nobody can force a movement of any kind to take any
pre-arranged pattern to any very great extent” (Letters, 89).
If one were to locate a consistent thread in Yeats‟s politics, it would be his
commitment to the school of John O‟Leary, however much it took on protean hues
15

For more on Yeats‟s stance on colonialism, see Rob Dogget‟s Deep Rooted Things. There, he reads
Yeats‟s plays and poems as “seemingly retreat[ing] from the material fact of colonization into essential
notions of Irish identity, a form of strategic negation, a manifestation of subaltern consciousness that
registers empire‟s co-dependent logic but that does not fetishize the subaltern as heroic victim” (87).
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through his different political affiliations. Essentially, the school of O‟ Leary was strictly
libertarian and individualist; unlike Arthur Griffith‟s nationalism that demanded
subordination to the Irish state, Yeats followed the old nationalism in the footsteps of
Henry Grattan, Wolf Tone, and Thomas Davis. Indeed, O‟Leary was far more invested
in achieving national liberty than in realizing social equality: this points to why O‟Leary
departed from the Republican model of constitutional reform as a viable path to an
independent, democratic Republic. Following suit, Yeats consistently praises the
martyrs, poets, and failed revolutionaries over constitutional politicians, whom he
deemed well-intentioned but ultimately ineffectual. Yet it is important to further note
that Yeats considered the Irish struggle less in terms of racial identification than with
economic egalitarianism, and so he considered nationalism as a movement against the
uniformity of modern materialist civilization espoused by the middle classes.
Yeats‟s early involvement with socialism had deep lasting effects on all his later
political involvements. Rather than joining the mainstream labor movement, Yeats was
especially drawn to the social criticism of Carlyle and Ruskin that William Morris
married to Marxism and was accordingly able to blame the inhumanity of social
relationships for the decline of art. The model of the ancient Irish bard offered Yeats a
suitable alternative: both legislator and prophet, the bard shared the qualities of his great
predecessors—Blake, Nietzsche, and Shelley—as a rebel against authoritarian
government and social institutions. Yet Yeats‟s zeal for unfettered liberalism was
compromised on one point: although he feared the growing authority of the state to
restrict the state of an individual, he nonetheless supported State action to support the
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condition of the wretched. In sum, Yeats initially hoped to follow Morris in balancing
individual purpose with social concern.
This uneasy synthesis, however, would become increasingly strained during
Yeats‟s double appointments to the Irish Senate in 1922 and in 1925 (he retired in 1928).
Early in his office, Yeats took a hard-line libertarian, and decidedly Protestant-minority,
approach against the Catholic ethos that would ban divorce. Yeats predicted that such a
motion would isolate the Protestant minority and thereby decisively cut off Northern
Ireland through partition. His response was brutal: in a series of speeches, Yeats likened
the government and clergy‟s campaign tactics to “medieval Spain” and willfully offended
many of the wary legislators. In what Foster calls one of “WBY‟s supreme public
moments,” he called upon the “language of religious confrontation, rather than the more
tactful rhetoric of pluralism” (Vol II, 294). But his divisive politics were tempered by his
position as the spokes of Fine Arts; after his initial confrontations, he remained
committed to improving the conditions of secondary schools and was especially set on
introducing arts and crafts to an otherwise strictly utilitarian education. In 1924 he
chaired a coinage committee with the intent to select a set of designs for the nation‟s
currency; in control of the symbolic power of young nation‟s means of exchange, Yeats
opted a form that was “elegant, racy of the soil, and utterly unpolitical" (333). It was as
though Yeats sought to battle the utilitarian exchange-economy of Ireland by stamping on
its currency a mythic link.
During this time Yeats witnesses a Marxism that retained none of its mythical
ambience he found in Morris: the Red Terror. Yeats found an immediate parallel to the
Irish Civil War in the Bolshevik Revolution, and although Yeats‟s sympathy for the
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proletariat had not faded since his supporting them in the Dublin Lockout of 1913, he did
become increasingly fearful that the nationalists would unite with the socialists in Ireland
and usher in dictatorship.
Caught between the undesirable poles of tyrannical communism and the anarchy of
Ireland‟s war-torn Republic, Yeats turned to conservatism and began advocating
hierarchy and aristocracy as the only suitable alternative. In the summer of 1928, when
Yeats had left the Senate exhausted from protesting mob Catholicism, he was anxious for
a strong leader to take decisive action, and he found this role fulfilled by de Valera‟s
meteoric rise.
Thus followed Yeats‟s most regrettable foray into politics, namely with the fascist
and militaristic Blueshirts. Elizabeth Cullingford qualifies Yeats‟s involvement in
fascism by noting that it ultimately stemmed from his anti-capitalist impulse under
Morris, and that “Irish fascism was always more Irish than fascist” (118). Indeed, the
Blueshirts initially ran as the Army Comrades Association (ACA) that drew together exmembers of the Free State Army: given that the IRA positioned itself as communist, the
ACA, being Treatyite, identified with fascism. Yeats remained wary of the Blueshirts,
but he did speak his support for the group on the occasion of the IRA bringing off a
successful coup against de Valera. It would seem that Yeats could be pardoned for such
a foolish allegiance, in that he had legitimate concerns for his newfound nation being torn
asunder yet again by civil disorder and economic breakdown. But nonetheless the worst
of Yeats‟s aristocratic sensibilities came to bear during his brief involvement with the
Blueshirts that ended in the summer months of 1933. Yeats found de Valera analogous to
the authority of Hitler and Mussolini, the latter impressed upon him by Pound, and, most
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damning, his long interest in his Ascendancy genealogy intensified to the point of him
joining the Eugenics Society in the late „30s.
Yeats‟s interest in the Blueshirts was short-lived. Originally considering O‟Duffy
to be his antithetical hero, within a few months time he found him to be an uneducated
lunatic and later expressed his regret for his temporary outburst of fanaticism. In his final
years Yeats would revert back to the school of O‟Leary, finding faith only in the qualities
of individual men and in the singular achievement of aesthetics—a position that he took
up again with such vigor that it almost pushed him toward anarchism. Where Yeats
formerly thought fascism was a means to turn away from primary thought, he came to
realize that it was in fact the essence of it:
The antithetical is creative, painful—personal—the Primary imitative, happy,
general. It is the imitativeness in which there is always happiness, that makes the
Movements of our time attract the young. The art and politics of an antithetical
age expressed a long and maturing tradition and were best practiced by old men.
That age has ended in the old political jugglers of liberal democracy. I insist upon
that paradox, that the old age of our civilization begins with young men marching
in step, with the shirts and songs that gave our politics an air of sport (“Michael
Robartes” 222)
Many commentators have considered Yeats‟s last stance toward individualism as a
triumphal overcoming of the dark side of his political investments. But we must pay
heed to Yeats‟s admonition: "every movement, in feeling or in thought, prepares in the
dark by its own increasing clarity and confidence its own executioner" (Letters 418). For
Yeats, transition persisted at every corner during his long career, and his aesthetics
enabled a hyper-negativity that sought to mark a singular flow unencumbered by the
blockages before it. If transition was the case, contradiction became the means for
shaping the contours of its flux, a mode of negation that did not seek resolution, for to do
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so would be to submit to the tides. One might argue that such a stance would restrict
Yeats from locating the essence of Ireland. But this is precisely the point: Yeats sought
an Ireland that affirmed its own becoming rather than submitted to a homogenous rate, an
Ireland that refused to harden into self-reflexivity, an Ireland that had yet-to-come:
"When the new era comes …I imagine new races, as it were, seeking domination...”
(Vision 43).

45

Bibliography
Adams, Hazard. Blake and Yeats: The Contrary Vision. New York: Russell & Russell,
1968.
---, The Book of Yeats's Vision: Romantic Modernism and Antithetical Tradition. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995.
Bedient, Calvin. The Yeats Brothers and Modernism's Love of Motion. Notre Dame: U
of Notre Dame Press, 2009.
Billigheimer, Rachel V. Wheels of Eternity: A Comparative Study of William Blake and
William Butler Yeats. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.
Blake, William. Blake, the Complete Poems. 2nd ed. London; New York: Longman,
1989.
Bloom, Harold. Yeats. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.
Bornstein, George. “„Of What is Past, or Passing, or To Come‟: Recent Yeats
Scholarship.” Modernism/modernity. 16.3 (2009): 609-14.
--, “Yeats and Romanticism.” The Cambridge Companion to W.B. Yeats. Edited by
Marjorie Howes and John Kelly. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006. 19-36.
Bradbury, Malcom and James McFarlane. “The Name and Nature of Modernism.”
Modernism: A Guide to European Literature 1890-1930. London: Penguin Books,
1991: 19-55.
Cullingford, Elizabeth. Yeats, Ireland and Fascism. London : Macmillan, 1981.
Deleuze, Gilles Nietzsche and Philosophy. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1983.

46

--, and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of
Minnesota Press: 1987.
Doggett, Rob. Deep-Rooted Things : Empire and Nation in the Poetry and Drama of
William Butler Yeats. Notre Dame, Ind. : University of Notre Dame Press, 2006.
Ellmann, Richard. Yeats, the Man and the Masks. New York: Dutton, 1948.
Eysteinsson, Astradur. The Concept of Modernism. Ithaca: Cornell U Press, 1990.
Foster, R. F. W.B. Yeats: A Life Vol. 1. The Apprentice Mage. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997.
Frye, Northrop. Fearful Symmetry: A Study of William Blake. Buffalo: University of
Toronto Press, 2004.
Hickman, Miranda B. The Geometry of Modernism: The Vorticist Idiom in Lewis,
Pound, H.D., and Yeats. 1st ed. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005.
Horkheimer, Max and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical
Fragments. Ed. Gunzelin Noerr. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford University
Press: Stanford, 2002.
Jeffares, Alexander N. A Commentary on the Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats. Stanford
University Press, 1968.
Logenbach, James. Stone Cottage: Pound, Yeats, and Modernism. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988.
Longley, Edna. “„Modernism,‟ Poetry, and Ireland.” Rethinking Modernism. Ed.
Marianne Thormählen, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003: 160-80.
Mao, Douglas, and Rebecca L. Walkowitz. "The New Modernist Studies." PMLA.
123.3 (2008): 737-748.

47

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil : Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future.
Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2002.
--, “On the Genealogy of Morals.” Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Ed. and Trans. by
Walter Kaufmann. New York: Modern Library, 1968: 437-601.
--, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for None and All. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New
York: Penguin Books, 1978.
--, Twilight of the Idols, Or, how to Philosophize with a Hammer. Trans. Ducan Large.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
North, Michael. The Political Aesthetic of Yeats, Eliot, and Pound. Cambridge ; New
York : Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Schuchard, Roger. “‟As Regarding Rhythm‟: Minstrels and Imagists.” The Last
Minstrels. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 256-83.
Stead, C. K. “Yeats and Pound—Modern and Modernist.” Pound, Yeats, Eliot and the
Modernist Movement. London, 1986: 23-33.
Vendler, Helen. Our Secret Discipline: Yeats and Lyric Form. New York: Belnap Press,
2007.
Yeats, W. B. Autobiographies: Reveries over Childhood and Youth and the Trembling of
the Veil. 1st American Ed. New York: Macmillan, 1927.
-- , The Collected Poems of W.B Yeats. Edited by Richard J. Finneran. New York:
Scribner, 1997.
-- , Essays and Introductions. New York: Macmillan, 1961.
---, Explorations. New York, London: Macmillan, 1962.
--, Letters. Edited by Allan Wade. London: R. Hart-Davis, 1954.

48

--, Letters to the New Island. Edited by Horace Reynolds. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1934; 1888.
--, Michael Robartes and the Dancer : Manuscript Materials. Ithaca : Cornell University
Press, 1994.
---. Per Amica Silentia Lunae. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1918.
--, A Vision B. Rev. Ed. New York: Macmillan, 1918.
--, Ed. The Oxford Book of Modern Verse, 1892-1935. Oxoford: Oxford U Press, 1936.
--, Ed. The Works of William Blake, Poetic, Symbolic, and Critical. London: B.
Quaritch, 1893.
Wenthe, William J. “‟It Will be a Hard Toil‟: Yeats‟s Theory of Versification, 18991919.” Journal of Modern Literature. 21.1 (1997): 29-48.

